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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

the environment. The court reasoned that adding parkland to the
area would have only a benign effect on the environment and,
therefore, a failure to specify its location could not undercut the
conclusion of the Area-Wide EA. Moreover, D'Agnillo failed to
explain why the location of the parkland had to be included in the
Area-Wide EA.
Fourth, the court found that even though the original Area-Wide
EA failed to evaluate impacts on wetlands located in one of its site
areas, such failure did not warrant another area-wide EA. The court
found the City did not issue a FONSI for this site because of the
presence of wetlands. Instead, the City had commissioned a more
comprehensive environmental impact statement ("EIS") to evaluate
any impacts to the wetlands. Although the Area-Wide EA contained a
statement indicating no wetlands would be affected by the
development project, this factual inaccuracy was due to prior court
orders on the scope of the Area-Wide EA. In order to correct this
inaccuracy, the court indicated the Area-Wide EA would have to be
updated. However, the court felt that because the wetlands area was a
self-contained environmental matter, failing to discuss it in the AreaWide EA was not grounds for its invalidation, a new area-wide EA, or
an injunction to prevent construction by the City.
Fifth, the court found D'Agnillo had no basis to seek to enjoin
HUD from dispersing funds to the City. According to the court, HUD
could withhold funds only if it rejected a potential recipient's
environmental findings on limited procedural grounds spelled out in
its regulations. The court found the deficiencies alleged by D'Agnillo
in the EAs did not fall within these HUD regulations.
For the reasons stated, the district court denied D'Agnillo's
motion.
Matthew j Costinett
N.W. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Blue Heron Paper Co., No. 00-1201-KI, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17848 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding: (1)
environmental group's activities created sufficient constitutional
standing to bring suit against a paper mill under the Clean Water Act
based on allegations that the mill harmed fish populations in the
Willamette River; and (2) Oregon Revised Statute section
468.025(1) (b) regulating discharge of wastes into state waters created
no private cause of action to enforce the statute, but damages could be
sought by pleading the claim as a common-law tort).
Blue Heron Paper Co. ("BHPC") operated a recycling mill that
discharged high-temperature wastewater into the Willamette River.
Northwestern Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") sued BHPC
under both the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Oregon statutes. NEDC
alleged high-temperature water release adversely affected fish in the
river and the rights of NEDC members who fished those waters.
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NEDC further alleged heat discharges from the mill by BPHC's
predecessor, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. ("Smurfit"), violated the terms
of a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.
BHPC argued the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim under the
CWA. BHPC claimed NEDC failed to allege constitutional standing
requirements, specifically a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact
fairly traceable to the challenged actions of BHPC. Further, because
NEDC alleged only specific violations by Smurfit in its complaint,
NEDC failed to provide BHPC sufficient notice under the CWA.
Finally, BHPC argued NEDC had no cause of action under Oregon
Revised Statutes section 468.025 (1) (b), as no provision created private
enforcement of the statute.
The court found NEDC's complaint alleged sufficient injury-in-fact
based on the group's professed interest in the health of fish in the
Willamette River. The court found NEDC also provided BHPC
sufficient notice, as NEDC's complaint specifically alleged BPHC
violated the CWA by discharging waste heat into the river.
Information regarding Smurfit's prior, identical operation merely
clarified NEDC's allegations. BHPC argued NEDC's notice did not
allege specific dates on which BPHC violated the CWA, and was
therefore insufficient. However, BHPC took possession of the mill on
May 9, 2000, and NEDC sued on June 26, 2000. Thus, the court found
the notice effectively alleged BPHC's violations within a relatively short
time, and was therefore sufficient.
The court dismissed NEDC's claims under Oregon Revised Statute
section 468.025(1) (b) because, where a statute is silent on private
enforcement rights, a court considers private claims only when
necessary to carry out state policies.
In this case, Oregon's
Department of Environmental Quality enforced the statute, thereby
precluding NEDC's claims. The court granted NEDC leave to amend
its complaint, and to plead the claim as a common-law tort.
Alan Curtis
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Equilon Enters., L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g granted, 21 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001) (holding:
(1) dismissal of plaintiff oil company's action against consumer group
under California's "SLAPP" statute was proper where consumer
group's notices of intent to sue under Proposition 65 (formerly know
as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986) fell

